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Abstract
When the growth of aggregate consumption exhibits no serial correlation, the
socially efficient discount rate is independent of the time horizon, because
the wealth effect and the precautionary effect are proportional to the time
horizon. In this paper, we consider alternative growth processes: an AR(1),
a Brownian motion with unknown trend or volatility, a two-state regime-
switching model, and a model with an uncertain return of capital. All these
models exhibit some persistence of shocks on the growth rate of the economy
and fat tails, which implies that one should discount more distant costs and
benefits at a smaller rate.
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The publication in 1972 of “The Limits to Growth” by the Club of Rome
marked the emergence of a public awareness about collective perils associ-
ated with the sustainability of our development. Since then, citizens and
politicians have been confronted with a never ending list of environmental
problems: nuclear wastes, genetically modified organisms, climate change,
biodiversity, . . . This debate has recently culminated with the publication
of three reports. On one side, the Copenhagen Consensus (Lomborg (2004))
put top priority on public programs yielding immediate benefits (fighting
malaria and AIDS, improving water supply,...), and rejected the idea of in-
vesting to prevent of global warming. On the other side, the Stern Review
(Stern (2007)) and the fourth report of the IPPC (IPCC (2008)) put tremen-
dous pressure for acting quickly and heavily against global warming.
An important source of heterogeneity in the environmental policy rec-
ommendations comes from the selection of the discount rate. Behind this
selection lies a crucial question, how much should current generations be
willing to pay to improve the future? We all agree that one euro obtained
immediately is better than one euro obtained next year, mostly because of
the positive return we can get by investing this euro. This arbitrage ar-
gument implies that costs and benefits occurring in the future should be
discounted at a rate equal to the rate of return of capital over the corre-
sponding period. Because it is hard to predict the rate of return of capital
for several centuries, one should follow an alternative approach to select the
discount rate, which consists in evaluating explicitly the welfare effect of the
environmental policy under consideration for each future generation. Since it
compares consumption paths in which costs are redistributed across genera-
tions, it is important to make explicit the ethical and economic assumptions
on which these comparisons are made. Most environmental policies will gen-
erate winners and losers, but one evaluates the welfare gain by defining an
intergenerational welfare function which is a (discounted) sum of the welfare
of each generation.
The welfare approach to discounting is based on the additional assump-
tion that future generations will be richer than current ones. In a nutshell,
one should not be ready to pay one euro to reduce the loss borne by future
generations by one euro, given that these future generations will be so much
wealthier than us. Suppose for example, as in the Stern Review, that the
real growth rate of the world GDP per capita will be 1.3% per year over the
next 200 years, which implies that people will enjoy a real GDP per capita
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11 times larger in 2200 than it is today. Suppose also that, as in the Stern
Review in which the representative agent has a logarithmic utility function,
which means that doubling the GDP per capita halves the marginal utility of
wealth. Combining these two assumptions implies that one more unit of con-
sumption now has a marginal impact on social welfare that is 11 times larger
than the same increment of consumption in 2200. This wealth effect alone
corresponds to a discount rate of 1.3% per year. More generally, the so-called
Ramsey rule states that the socially efficient discount rate is the product of
the real growth rate of consumption times the elasticity of the marginal util-
ity of consumption. The Ramsey rule, and its underlying wealth effect, is
the cornerstone element in the current debate about the discount rate.
The Ramsey rule is subject to many criticisms in spite of the fact that
it provides a sound economic basis for discounting. The main difficulty with
the Ramsey rule comes from the complexity to predict the growth rate of
consumption. Estimating the growth rate for the coming year is already
a difficult task. No doubt, any estimation of growth for the next cen-
tury/millennium is subject to potentially enormous errors. The history of the
western world before the industrial revolution is full of important economic
slumps (invasion of the Roman Empire, Black Death, worldwide wars,. . . ).
Those who emphasize the effects of natural resource scarcity will forecast
lower growth rates in the future. Some even suggest a negative growth of
the GDP per head in the future, due to the deterioration of the environ-
ment, population growth and decreasing returns to scale. They claim that
the wealth effect goes the other direction, yielding a negative discount rate.
On the contrary, optimistic people will argue that the effects of the improve-
ments in information technology have yet to be realized, that there are still
many scientific and technological discoveries to be made, and that the world
will face a long period of prosperity. The rationale attitude would be to
recognize that there is a lot of uncertainty about the economic environment
in the distant future. This uncertainty casts some doubt on the relevance of
the wealth effect to justify the use of a large discount rate.
It is thus crucial to put growth uncertainty into the picture, as done in
section 2. This is required for the sake of realism, and it is essential if one
wants to provide a credible economic approach to the notion of sustainable
development. A first attempt in that direction has been provided by Gollier
(2002a, 2002b, 2007), and more recently by Weitzman (2007). Instrumental
to this analysis is the concept of prudence which refers to the consumer’s
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willingness to save more in the face of an increase in his future income risk,
or, equivalently, the willingness to sacrifice the present in the face of a more
uncertain future. Technically, an agent is prudent if the third derivative of
his utility function is positive. Macroeconomists have been measuring the
precautionary saving motive, and this literature tells us much about how
much sacrifice people should do when the economic environment of future
generations is uncertain.
Thus, the socially efficient discount rate has two main determinants, a
wealth effect and a precautionary effect. The larger the expected future
consumption or the smaller the future uncertainty, the larger is the discount
rate. We can apply this analysis for different time horizons to determine the
term structure of discount rates. In this paper, we discuss the importance of
the persistence of shocks on the growth of the economy, hence on the shape
of this structure. The high persistence of future shocks tends to magnify the
long-term risk, and the associated negative precautionary effect on the long-
term discount rate. Thus, as explained in Gollier (2007), it justifies using a
smaller rate to discount cash flows occurring in a more distant future.
This paper reviews the standard consumption-based theory of the term
structure of discount rates. The benchmark model is based on a power utility
function for the representative agent and an arithmetic Brownian process for
the log consumption. We show in section 2 that this implies that the socially
efficient discount rate be independent of the time horizon. We then show
that the persistence of shocks to the growth rate of the economy can justify
using a decreasing term structure. Several models exhibiting this property
are presented and discussed in the core of the paper.
1 The extended Ramsey rule
We consider a standard utilitarian welfare function
W =
X
t=0
e−δtEu(ct). (1)
The preferences of the representative agent in the economy are represented
by her utility function u and by her rate of pure preference for the present
δ. In a model with multiple generations, the current generation integrates
the welfare of the next generation as if it was its own one. Thus, there
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is pure altruism in model (1). The utility function u on consumption is
assumed to be three times differentiable, increasing and concave. Let ct
denote consumption at date t. Consider a marginal risk-free investment at
date 0 which generates a single benefit ert at date t per euro invested at
date 0. At the margin, investing in this project has the following impact on
welfare:
∆W = e−δtertEu0 (ct)− u0(c0). (2)
The first term in the right-hand side is the welfare benefit that such invest-
ment yields. Consumption at date t is increased by ert, which yields an
increase in expected utility by Eu0 (ct) ert, which must be discounted at rate
δ to take account of the delay. The second term, u0(c0), is the welfare cost
of reducing consumption today. Because ∆W is increasing in r, there exists
a critical rate of return denoted rt, such that ∆W = 0 for r = rt. Obviously,
rt is the socially efficient discount rate, which satisfies the following standard
pricing formula:
rt = δ −
1
t
ln
Eu0(ct)
u0(c0)
. (3)
If financial markets would be frictionless and efficient, rt would be the equi-
librium interest rate associated to maturity t. This formula is the standard
asset pricing formula for riskfree bonds (See for example Cochrane (2001)).
Suppose that u0(c) = c−γ, where γ represents the constant relative risk
aversion of the representative agent.1 Suppose also that
Xt = ln ct − ln c0
normally distributed. As is well-known,2 the Arrow-Pratt approximation
is exact for an exponential function and a normally distributed risk. This
implies that
Eu0(ct)
u0(c0)
= E exp(−γXt) = exp(−γ(EXt − 0.5γV ar(Xt))).
1Gollier (2002a, 2002b) examines the impact of relaxing this assumption on the term
structure of the socially efficient discount rate.
2See Gollier (2007) for a formal proof.
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It implies in turn that
rt = δ + γ
EXt
t
− 0.5γ2V ar(Xt)
t
, (4)
or equivalently, that
rt = δ + γgt − 0.5γ(γ + 1)
V ar(Xt)
t
, (5)
where gt = t−1 ln(Ect/c0) = t−1(EXt+0.5V ar(Xt)) is the annualized growth
rate of mean consumption.3 This formula states that the socially efficient
discount rate has three determinants. The first one is the rate of pure prefer-
ence for the present, δ, which we put equal to zero in this paper. The second
one is the wealth effect, which is measured by γgt, the product of relative
risk aversion and the annualized growth rate of mean consumption between
0 and t. The third determinant is the precautionary effect. We see that it
has an effect that is equivalent to a sure reduction of the growth rate of
consumption by 0.5(γ + 1)t−1V ar(Xt), which is the precautionary premium
defined by Kimball (1990). Indeed, γ + 1 is the index of relative prudence
−cu000(c)/u00(c). The uncertainty on the wealth available to the generation
living at date t tends to reduce the discount rate associated to that date,
which implies that more sacrifice must be endured today to increase wealth
at that date.
Stern (2007) considers the following specification: δ = 0.1%, gt = 1.3%,
V ar(Xt) = 0 and γ = 1. Equation (5) applied with these values of the
parameters implies that rt = 1.4% per year. Actually, Stern does not use
explicitly a discount rate, because the investment project is not marginal.
Therefore, the marginalist approach presented in this section cannot be used
in his context. Rather, Stern estimates the sure immediate and permanent
loss in consumption that yields the same effect on welfare W as the impacts
of climate change. However, in Stern (2007), the certainty equivalent loss
does not exceed 15% of GDP in 2200, which is not far of being ”marginal”.
3Using the trick of the Arrow-Pratt formula being exact in this specification, we have
indeed that
Ect
c0
= E exp(xt) = exp(Ext + 0.5V ar(xt)) = exp gtt.
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In order to evaluate this point, let us evaluate in a non-marginal way the
maximum share y of current GDP that one should be ready to sacrifice to
eliminate a sure loss of 15% of GDP in 200 years, where y is the solution of
the following iso-welfare condition:
u(c0) + e−δtu(0.85c0e200g) = u(c0(1− y)) + e−δtu(c0e200g).
Under the calibration of Stern, we obtain y = 12.46%. This corresponds to
discounting the future loss of 0.15 exp(200g) at a rate of 1.39% per year.
Using a non-marginalist approach to valuing efforts to mitigate global warm-
ing does not noticeably change the conclusion compared to using a standard
cost-benefit analysis of certainty equivalent impacts with a discount rate of
1.4%.
2 The term structure of discount rates
In the previous section, we determined the socially efficient rate to discount
a cash-flow occurring at date t, as a function of the expectations about
GDP/cap at that date. The Ramsey rule (4) holds for all t, which means that
it characterizes the term structure of the socially efficient discount rate. It de-
pends upon how EXt/t and V ar(Xt)/t evolve with t. The simplest and most
classical case has ln ct follow an arithmetic Brownian motion with trend μ and
volatility σ: d ln ct = μdt+σdz. This is equivalent to dct/ct = gdt+σdz, with
g = μ+ 0.5σ2. In that case, EXt = E(ln ct− ln c0) = μt and V ar(Xt) = σ2t.
This implies that
rt = δ + γμ− 0.5γ2σ2 or rt = δ + γg − 0.5γ(γ + 1)σ2. (6)
This so-called extended Ramsey rule is equivalent to those obtained by
Mankiw (1981), Hansen and Singleton (1983), Breeden (1986) and Camp-
bell (1986). It implies in particular that the socially efficient discount rate
is independent of the time horizon. The independence of the discount rate
with respect to the maturity is an important feature of the standard specifi-
cation with a power utility function and an arithmetic Brownian motion for
the growth rate of consumption. In the absence of uncertainty (σ = 0), this
constancy of the discount rate is due to the constancy of the growth rate g
of consumption. It implies a constant rate of reduction of marginal utility
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by γμ. In order to maintain utility unchanged, this must be compensated by
a constant growth rate γμ of the cash-flow. When uncertainty is introduced,
the same story holds, because it raises expected marginal utility at constant
rate 0.5γ2σ2. This is a consequence of the fact that the stochastic process is
i.i.d., implying that the uncertainty on consumption in t years is proportional
to t.
What do we know about the growth process of consumption? Using
annual data from 1889 to 1978, Kocherlakota (1996) estimated g = 1.8%
and σ = 3.6%. Assuming δ = 0, this yields a discount rate equaling
r = 0.018γ − 0, 000635γ2.
In Table 1, we decompose the socially efficient discount rate into its wealth
and precautionary components for different degrees of risk aversion. We
observe that the precautionary component is a second order effect compared
to the wealth effect, at least for reasonable values of γ.
γ wealth effect precautionary effect discount rate
1 1.8% −0.06% 1.74%
2 3.6% −0.25% 3.34%
4 7.2% −1.02% 6.18%
Table 1: Decomposing the discount rate into the wealth and precautionary
components
We have seen that the constancy of the discount rate mostly relies on
the constancy of three economic variables: the trend of growth, the volatil-
ity of growth, and relative risk aversion. Gollier (2002a,b) relaxed the third
assumption. He showed that the term structure of the discount rate should
be decreasing if relative risk aversion is decreasing. Relaxing the constancy
of the expected growth rate has obvious consequences on the discount rate,
which are made explicit in equation (5). In particular, in an economy with di-
minishing expectations (∂gt/∂t < 0), the term structure should be decreasing
because the wealth effect vanishes. We hereafter examine the consequences
of relaxing the constancy of volatility.
2.1 Persistent shocks on growth
The benchmark model examined above is based on the assumption that ag-
gregate log consumption follows a pure random walk, or that the growth rate
7
of consumption has no serial correlation. But Cochrane (1988) and Cogley
(1990) have shown that this hypothesis is rejected by the data in most coun-
tries. Let us thus alternatively assume that the change in log consumption
exhibits some persistence that takes the form of an AR(1) process:
ln ct+1 = ln ct + xt
xt = φxt−1 + (1− φ)μ+ εt
where ε0, ε1, ... are normal i.i.d. with mean zero and variance σ2.We get the
benchmark specification as a special case of this AR(1) with φ = 0. When φ
is positive and less than unity, the change in log consumption exhibits some
persistence. It is straightforward to check that
Xt = ln ct − ln c0 = μt+ (x−1 − μ)
φ(1− φt)
1− φ +
tX
τ=1
1− φτ
1− φ εt−τ .
It implies that
EXt
t
= μ+ (x−1 − μ)
φ(1− φt)
t(1− φ) .
When the state variable x−1 at date 0 is larger than μ, the persistence of
the past positive shock generates a positive wealth effect that vanishes over
time. It justifies a decreasing term structure. The opposite configuration
arises when x−1 is smaller than μ.
We then get that
V ar(Xt)
t
=
σ2
(1− φ)2 + σ
2φ(1− φt)
t(1− φ)3
"
φ(1 + φt)
1 + φ
− 2
#
.
This is increasing in t when there is some persistence (φ > 0). The positive
serial correlation of the growth process tends to magnify the long term risk
relative to the short term one. From (4), the increasing precautionary effect
that this generates justifies a decreasing term structure. Because V ar(Xt)/t
converges to σ2/(1 − φ)2 when t tends to infinity whereas V (X1) = σ2, the
precautionary effect is multiplied by a factor (1 − φ)−2 when going from
the very short term to infinity. For example, when φ = 0.3, the long term
precautionary effect is two times larger than the short term effect.
Notice that the short-term interest rate in this model also follows an
AR(1) process since, using equation (4), the short-term interest rate at date
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t equals δ − 0.5γ2σ2 + γ(1 − φ)μ +γφxt−1. This indicates that this model
is a discrete-time consumption-based version of the Vasicek (1977) model
of the term structure of interest rates. Moreover, because changes in the
short-term interest rate are proportional to changes in past log consumption,
the degree φ of persistence of the latter equals the degree of persistence of
the former, which has been well documented in the literature on the term
structure of interest rate. For example, Backus, Foresi and Telmer (1998)
consider φ = 0.024 month−1, which corresponds to φ = 0.3 year−1.
Because φ = 0.3 per year yields a half-life time of 2.3 years, this model
is useful to justify differences in discount rates for maturities expressed in
years, but not really for maturities expressed in decades or centuries.
2.2 A model with parameter uncertainty
As invoked in the so-called Peso-problem, the absence of a sufficiently large
data set to estimate the long-term growth process of the economy implies that
the parameters controlling the growth process are uncertain and subject to
learning in the future. To take into account this observation, we extend
the benchmark model presented in section 2 by introducing some parametric
uncertainty, as in Gollier (2007). Suppose that log consumption follows an
arithmetic Brownian motion with trend μ(θ) and volatility σ(θ). These values
depend upon parameter θ, which is unknown at date 0. This uncertainty is
characterized by random variable eθ. By the law of iterated expectations,
equation (3) can be rewritten as
rt = δ −
1
t
lnEθ
"
E [u0(ct)| θ]
u0(c0)
#
= δ − 1
t
lnEθ
h
exp
h
−γt(μ(eθ)− 0.5γσ(eθ)2)ii ,
where the second equality is obtained by using again that the Arrow-Pratt
approximation is exact in the case of an exponential function and a normally
distributed random variable (conditional to θ). We conclude that rt equals
δ + γMt, where Mt is the certainty equivalent of μ (eθ) − 0.5γσ(eθ)2 under
function vt(x) = − exp(−γtx) :
exp [−γtMt] = E exp
h
−γt(μ(eθ)− 0.5γσ(eθ)2)i (7)
Because an increase in t makes function vt more concave, we directly ob-
tain that Mt is decreasing in t. It equals M0 = E
h
μ(eθ)− 0.5γσ(eθ)2i for
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the instantaneous rate, and it tends to the lowest possible value M∞ =
minθ [μ(θ)− 0.5γσ(θ)2]. This implies that the socially efficient discount rate
decreases with the time horizon.
Gollier (2007) provides an intuition for why the uncertainty surrounding
the drift of the growth process justifies selecting a smaller long discount
rate. Indeed, the observation of a high (low) growth in the short run induces
the representative agent to revise her expectations about the distribution of
growth upwards (downwards). Thus, Bayesian learning generates a positive
correlation in the perceived growth process. This magnifies the long-term
risk, thereby inducing the prudent representative agent to make more effort
for the distant future. This risk magnification effect is described in Figures
1 and 2, where we assume that σ2 = 3.6% and μ equals either 0.8% or
2.8% with equal probabilities. In Figure 1, we compare the densities of X1,
i.e. the log of consumption in one year, under this parametric uncertainty,
or when we assume that μ = 1.8% for sure. In Figure 2, we do the same
comparison for a time horizon of 100 years. For both time horizons t = 1 and
t = 100, the parametric uncertainty makes the tails fatter, thereby raising
the precautionary effect and reducing the discount rate. But the intensity of
the phenomenon is much stronger for the long-term rate. This explains that
the term structure of the socially efficient discount rates, which is drawn in
Figure 3, should be decreasing when the drift of economic growth is subject
to parametric uncertainty.
Weitzman (2007) considers a special case of parametric uncertainty where
μ is known, but σ has an inverted Gamma probability distribution. Because
the inverted-Gamma distribution has an unbounded support, we directly
conclude that the socially efficient discount rate rt tends to −∞ when t
tends to infinity. This is because the representative agents are upset about
the possibility of an arbitrary large volatility of the growth of consumption,
which makes them extremely prudent. This model is linked to the notion
of fat-tails, since a normal distribution combined with an inverted Gamma
distribution for the volatility yields a Student-t distribution, which has tails
fatter than the normal. As shown by Barro (2006) for example, thickening
the lower tail of the aggregate risk of the economy can have devastating
effects on the socially efficient discount rate. Weitzman (2007) shows that
if one replaces the distribution of log consumption from normal to Student-
t, which has fatter tails, then the socially efficient discount rate goes to
minus infinity. Of course, because this specification is unrealistic, it leads
10
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Figure 1: The density of the log of consumption in one year with (plain curve)
and without (dashed curve) parametric uncertainty on the drift of economic
growth.
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Figure 2: The density of the log of consumption in 100 years with (plain
curve) and without (dashed curve) parametric uncertainty on the drift of
economic growth.
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Figure 3: The term structure of discount rates when γ = 2, δ = 0, σ = 3.6%
and μ ∼ (0.8%, 1/2; 2.8%, 1/2).
to unrealistic policy recommendations. The existence of catastrophic risks
raises a difficult challenge for the econometrician, since the rarer an event the
more uncertain is the estimate of its probability. Similarly, we don’t know
much about the shape of marginal utility at very low levels of consumption.
The critical question is whether it tends to infinity when consumption goes
to zero, which implies that one would be ready to give up our entire wealth
to reduce the probability to end up with zero consumption.
In fact, the result that rt tends to minus infinity holds in the CRRA case
whenever the support of μ − 0.5γσ2 is unbounded below. Suppose alterna-
tively that σ2 can take value v/2 or 10v, respectively with probabilities 18/19
and 1/19, which implies that the mean variance equals v = (3.6%)2, as in
the benchmark case. It yields
rt = δ + γμ−
1
t
ln
∙
18
19
e0.25γ
2vt +
1
19
e5γ
2vt
¸
.
In Figure 4, we represented the term structure of discount rates for γ = 2,
δ = 0, μ = 1.8%, v = (3.6%)2. We see that the short-term discount rate
equals 3.34% as in the benchmark case with σ = 3.6%, but converges to
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Figure 4: The term structure of discount rates (in %) when the variance of
the growth rate of the economy is uncertain.
1.01% for very large time horizons. This asymptotic discount rate is the
one that one would obtain by using the extended Ramsey rule (6) with the
large volatility σ =
√
10v, which is
√
10 = 3.1 times the standard deviation
of the growth rate of the aggregate consumption in the US from 1889 to
1978. Weitzman’s extreme conclusion comes from the fact that the observed
volatility of growth over this period does not exclude in theory the possibility
that the true volatility can be much larger than
√
10v ' 11.4%.
2.3 Risk of catastrophic recessions
Another way to introduce some persistence in shocks on growth is to consider
a Markov process. Suppose that there are two states, s = g and s = b,
yielding different expected changes in log consumption μ(sg) = μg > μb =
μ(sb). In each period, there is some probability πs that the state will reverse.
This stochastic process is described as follows:
ln ct+1 = ln ct + xt
xt = μ(st) + εt
P [st+1 = b | st = g ] = πg and P [st+1 = g | st = b ] = πb,
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where εt is i.i.d. normal with mean zero and variance σ2. Cecchetti, Lam
and Mark (2000) estimated such a two-state regime-switching process for
the US economy using the annual per capita consumption data covering the
period 1890-1994. Table 2 reproduces their estimates. It reveals that the low-
growth state is moderately persistent but very bad, with consumption growth
in that state being μb = −6.78%. On the contrary, the high-growth state
is highly persistent, with consumption growth in that state equaling 2.25%.
The economy spends most of the time in this state with the unconditional
probability of being in state g equaling πb/(πg + πb) = 96%.
μg μb πg πb σ
2.25% −6.75% 2.2% 48.4% 3.13%
Table 2: Estimates of the regime-switching consumption process
Source: Cecchetti et al. (2000, Table 2)
One can solve this problem by recursion. Let us define mst in such a way
that
exp
³
−γmst+1
´
= E [exp (−γ(xτ + ...+ xτ+t)) |sτ = s ] .
It implies that
exp
³
−γmst+1
´
= (1−πs) exp
³
−γ(μs − 0.5γσ2 +mst)
´
+πs exp
³
−γ(μ−s − 0.5γσ2 +m−st )
´
which, together with ms0 = 0, allows us to compute mst by recursion. We can
then derive the term structure since
rt [s0 = s] = δ + γ
mst
t
.
In Figures 5 and 6, we draw the term structures that prevail respectively
in the good state and in the bad state. The two rates converge towards
r∞ = 3.26%. In the good state, the term structure is decreasing because of
the persistence of the shock, implying that the long-term risk is much larger
than the short-term one. In the bad state, things can only be better in the
future, and the expectation of recovery generates a strong wealth effect that
yields an increasing term structure.
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Figure 5: The term structure in the regime-switching model: Good state.
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Figure 6: The term structure in the regime-switching model: Bad state.
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2.4 Initially uncertain return of capital
Weitzman (1998, 2001) provides a very simple argument in favour of a de-
creasing term structure. Let θ denote the annualized return of capital in the
economy. By a simple arbitrage argument, it must be that the discount rate
equals θ. This means that an investment project with payoff B at date t per
euro invested at date 0 is efficient if and only if its NPV −1 +Be−θt is posi-
tive. Suppose now that θ is uncertain at the time of the investment decision.
Following Weitzman, suppose that the optimal criterion in this environment
is to invest in any project with a positive expected NPV. Obviously, this
would mean using a discount rate Rt such that
ft(Rt) = Eft(eθ), (8)
with ft(x) = e−tx. Because f is decreasing and convex, we directly derive
that Rt is less than E eθ. Moreover, because an increase in t makes ft more
convex in the sense of Arrow-Pratt, this reduces the ”certainty equivalent”
Rt of eθ. Weitzman concludes that the uncertainty on the rate of return of
capital justifies using the smallest possible rate (i.e., the lower bound of the
support of eθ) to discount very distant cash flows. Gollier (2004) criticized this
simple argument on the basis that there is no theoretical justification to use
the expected net present value criterion when the interest rate is uncertain.4
In this section, we explore a very stylized model that allows us to discuss
Weitzman’s argument with a fully fledged economic model.
For the sake of simplicity, let us depart from the infinite horizon approach
that we used in this paper, and suppose that the representative investor has
a finite lifetime [0, T ]. Suppose also that his lifetime wealth is w, and that
the return θ of wealth is revealed at date ε = 0+. After observing θ, his
consumption-saving problem can be solved under certainty:
max
c
TZ
0
e−δtu(c(t))dt s.t.
TZ
0
e−θtc(t)dt = w.
The solution of this problem is a function c(t, θ) that solves the first-order
condition eδtu0(c(t, θ)) = λ(θ)e−θt, or equivalently,
e−θt =
e−δtu0(c(t, θ))
u0(c0(θ))
, (9)
4See also the recent analysis and discussion by Buchholz and Schumacher (2008).
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with c0(θ) = c(0, θ). Under constant relative risk aversion γ, the growth
rate of consumption will be a constant g(θ) = (θ − δ)/γ. This means that
the initial productivity shock on the growth rate of consumption is infinitely
persistent in this model.
Now, consider a marginal investment project that yields a payoff B = eRtt
at date t per euro invested at time 0. This investment decision must be made
prior to the resolution of the uncertainty on eθ.5 This marginal project has
no effect on the expected lifetime utility of the agent if and only if
−Eu0(c0(eθ)) + eRtte−δtEu0(c(t, eθ)) = 0.
This determines the socially efficient discount rate for maturity t. It is defined
by
e−Rtt =
Eeδtu0(c(t, eθ))
Eu0(c0(eθ)) =
Ee−eθtu0(c0(eθ))
Eu0(c0(eθ)) , (10)
where the second equality is obtained by using equation (9). This equation
can be rewritten as ft(Rt) = bEft(eθ), where ft(x) = e−tx and bE is the risk-
neutral expectation operator bEft(eθ) = Eft(eθ)u0(c0(eθ))/Eu0(c0(eθ)). The same
argument as the one provided by Weitzman (1998,2001) can thus be used,
but with the important correction of using risk-neutral probabilities. We
conclude that the term structure of the socially efficient discount rate in this
environment is decreasing and that it converges to the lowest possible rate
of return of capital.
Observe that this model is not far from the one developed in section
2.2 with parametric uncertainty. In this model, the uncertain parameter
θ endogenously determines the growth of the economy. The assumed high
persistence of the initial shock on capital returns is transmitted to the con-
sumption process. As for the other models presented above, this persistence
explains the decreasing nature of the term structure, which is estimated by
Newell and Pizer (2003), Groom, Koundouri, Panipoulou, and Pantelides
(2007), and Gollier, Koundouri and Pantelides (2008).
5Of course, there is a high option value to wait that is not considered in Weitzman
(1998, 2001) or here.
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3 Conclusion
We have provided various arguments in favour of using a smaller discount
rate for more distant maturities. The central argument is based on some
persistence of shocks on aggregate consumption. This persistence magnifies
the long-term risk relative to the short-term risk. If the representative agent
is prudent, there is then a precautionary argument in favour of increasing
the value of more distant benefits. This justifies a decreasing term structure
for the discount rate. We examine various models exhibiting these features.
Two of them are particularly compelling in the context of sustainable devel-
opment. The first one relies on parametric uncertainty. If the growth process
is sensitive to some parameter whose value is currently not perfectly known,
the successive updated beliefs will exhibit persistence. This persistence due
to learning should be treated just the same way as would a model with no
learning, but with a persistence pattern in growth rates due to a drift over
time. Simple but reasonable specifications of this model yield a term struc-
ture going from 3.5% in the short term to 1% in a millennium. The other
model is based on a two-state regime-switching growth process. Because of
the high persistence of Markov shocks, the term structure is also decreasing
in this model. The intuition is that, when considering more distant time hori-
zons, there is a cumulative effect of the uncertainty about the duration of the
time spent in the bad state. Using an econometric estimation of this process
on US data by Cecchetti et al. (2000), and assuming that we are currently
in the good state, we obtained a term structure that goes from 4.3% to 3.4%
when maturities go from zero to 100 years.
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